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I. INTRODUCTION

Are international tribunals always a better alternative to national
prosecutions of international war crimes? Some members of the
international community appear to be moving towards legitimizing the
idea of international criminal tribunals as the appropriate fora for such
prosecutions.' The most recent example is the U.N. Security Council
referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC) of the case against Sudan
for violations that occurred in the Darfur region.2 Notwithstanding this
acceptance of international criminal tribunals, a recent case, Ademi/Norac,
at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
demonstrates the willingness of international prosecutors to transfer cases

* Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. This Article represents
the views of the author only and not those of her law firm. J.D./Maitrise en Droit, Cornell Law
School and Universitd Paris I-Panth6on-Sorbonne, 2002; D.E.A. (Master's Degree), Private
International Law, Universit6 Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne, 2003; B.A., French Literature and
Political Science, Rutgers University, 1998.
1. See generally Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity. Can InternationalCriminalJustice
PreventFutureAttrocities?, 95 Am. J. INT'LL. 1 (2001); David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence,
and the Limits ofInternationalJustice, 23 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J. 473 (1999).

2. S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005); Carl
Magnus, U.N. Makes FirstReferral to ICC: Darfur, INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 2005, at 15.
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back to national tribunals.' This paradox begs the question-are
international prosecutions the appropriate alternative to national
prosecutions? Once we resort to national prosecutions, how do we ensure
that they will proceed in accordance with international criminal law
standards? Finally, are hybrid tribunals, that is, tribunals created through
an agreement between a host country and an international body, such as
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Special Court), yet a better alternative
as compared to purely national courts?
The debate regarding the relative value of international, hybrid and
national tribunals mostly centers around theoretical issues, such as
deterrence, retribution, and national reconciliation.4 For example, scholars
wonder about the best deterring effect on future Saddams or
Milosevices-in other words, which type of prosecution creates the
strongest deterring effect and has the most impact on the conduct of future
leaders prone to committing atrocities? Moreover, which type of
prosecution provides the strongest sense of retribution to the local
population? Finally, in terms of national reconciliation, which type of
prosecution is the most prone to bringing about healing and closure to a
war-torn country? Nonetheless, besides the theoretical issues, practical
problems also affect the validity of each type of tribunal and warrant
additional attention. In other words, the decision to resort to a particular
type of prosecution cannot be examined in purely theoretical terms
because practical considerations often dictate a particular outcome.
This Article will focus on some of the practical considerations
underlying the decision to resort to a particular type of prosecution:
international, hybrid, or national. Part II of this Article will describe the
ICTY's referral of the Ademi/Norac case to Croatian national courts,
focusing on the reasons underlying the referral, as well as on the

3. Decision for Referral to the Authorities of the Republic of Croatia Pursuant to Rule 11 bis
The Prosecutor v. Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac, Case No. IT-04-78-PT, Sept. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.icty.org (last visited on Mar. 9, 2006) [hereinafter Referral Bench].
4. See, e.g., Wippman, supra note 1, at 474 (noting that supporters of international
prosecutions argue that such prosecutions are important because of their deterrence value, their
considerations of justice, their respect for international law, retribution, avoidance of personal
vengeance, de-legitimation of indicted war criminals as political leaders, and national
reconciliation). For a discussion of the relative value of the ICC versus ad hoc international
criminal tribunals, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, see Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal
Court: A New and Necessary Institution Meriting Continued International Support, 28 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 292, 293-94 (2005). For a discussion on the deterrence value of international criminal
prosecutions, see generally Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of
Outreach and Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crimes Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 547 (2005).
See also Akhavan, supra note 1, at 12-13.
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appropriateness of the referral in light of international criminal law. Part
III will then focus on the Special Court, in an effort to assess whether such
a hybrid tribunal is a better form of international justice. Finally, Part IV
will outline certain paradigms in an effort to propose solutions for certain
types of cases and to determine which type of prosecution, international,
hybrid or national, is best for each situation.
II. ICTY REFERRAL OF THE ADEMI/NORAC CASE TO CROATIA

In 2001, the ICTY issued indictments against Rahim Ademi and Mirko
Norac, charging them with crimes against humanity and violations of the
laws or customs of war. They were charged on the basis of both their
individual responsibility and their command responsibility, that is, their
responsibility as superiors for acts committed by their subordinates.5
On September 14, 2005, the ICTY's Referral Bench issued a decision
referring the case against Rahim Ademi and Mirko Norac back to the
Republic of Croatia.6 The ICTY referred the Ademi/Norac case to Croatia
as part of its completion strategy, which calls for the ICTY to complete all
first-instance trials by 2008 and all related work by 2010.! However, this
is an unusual case because it is the first case in which persons indicted by
the ICTY for such serious violations of international humanitarian law
have been referred to the Republic of Croatia, and it is the only case that
the ICTY's Prosecution requested a transfer to the Republic of Croatia.!
The ICTY has begun transferring a small number of other cases to the
other republics of the former Yugoslavia, in particular, to Serbia and to
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where special tribunals have been created to
prosecute offenders of war crimes. 9 Nonetheless, the ICTY has only

5. Referral Bench, supranote 3, M 15-16.
6. Id.
7. Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal
Tribunals:Lessonsfrom the Nuremberg Process?,28 FORDHAM INT'LL.J. 591, 612 (2005); Jelena
Jolic & Robert Lochary, ICTY ConsidersTransferringAdemi/Norac Caseto Croatia:What arethe
Issues National Courts Face as Cases Are Transferredfrom InternationalTribunals?, INT'L L.
NEWS, Summer 2005, at 10. See alsoNote, ProsecutingSaddam andBunglingTransitionalJustice
in Iraq,45 VA. J. INT'L L. 467, 513, 516 (2005) [hereinafter TransitionalJusticein Iraq]. See also
Terry Carter, Playingby the Rule ofLaw, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2005, at 53.
8. Referral Bench, supra note 3, 1.
9. Mundis, supra note 7, at 591; Carter, supra note 7, at 52; Alison Freebairn & Nerma
Jelacic, Bringing War Crimes JusticeBack Home, GLOBAL POL'Y F., Nov. 26, 2004, availableat
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/yugo/2004/1126backhome.htm (last visited on
Dec. 22,2005).
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transferred cases involving mid- and lower-level offenders, and is still
seeking to prosecute higher-ranked offenders of genocide and war crimes.
In its findings in the Ademi/Norac case, the Referral Bench found that
all requirements according to Rule 1ibis of the ICTY's Rules ofProcedure
and Evidence were satisfied.' 0 These requirements include the protection
of witnesses, a fair trial for the accused, and the assurance that the death
penalty would not be imposed." In addition, the Referral Bench
maintained the authority to recall the case to the ICTY, and required the
ICTY Prosecutor to provide an initial status report after six weeks, and a
report every three months thereafter.12 The Referral Bench ordered the
ICTY Prosecutor to hand over all materials supporting the indictment and
other appropriate evidentiary materials to the Prosecutor of the Republic
of Croatia. 3
Critics of the ICTY argue that such transfers, as well as the completion
of the tribunal's work, are long overdue. These critics maintain that the
ICTY and other international tribunals have stifled the growth of national
judiciaries in an area where war crimes occurred, by substituting
themselves for national justice systems.' 4 However, such criticism fails to
appropriately evaluate the state of national judicial systems that have been
shattered by war and dictatorships.' 5 Croatia is a prime example.
Croatian courts have prosecuted hundreds of war crimes cases;
however, the majority of them have been in absentia cases against Serbs.
International monitoring agencies have noted inadequacies, such as the
lack of specificity in indictments, instances of overcharging the potential
defendants, significant delays, and inadequate establishment of facts to
support convictions.' According to a 2002 Organization for Security and
10. Referral Bench, supra note 3, 31.
11. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since
1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.34 (2005), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/index.htm (last visited on Dec. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Rule
I1bis].
12. Referral Bench, supra note 3, at 12.
13. Id.
14. Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 10. See also Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7,
at 513.
15. Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 516 (citing Allison Marston Danner,
Navigating Law and Politics: The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and the
Independent Counsel, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1662 (2003) (noting the difficulties that a national

court may face, such as the mono-ethnic composition of a court, the difficulty of protecting victims
and witnesses effectively, the court personnel's lack of training and the backlog of cases at such

courts)).
16. Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 10.
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Co-operation in Europe report, out of 18 war crimes verdicts issued in
Croatia in 2002, 15 were against Serbs and 3 were against Croats.
Unsurprisingly, all 15 Serbs were convicted while all 3 Croats were
acquitted.'7
Croatia has nonetheless made good faith efforts to address these issues.
For example, the state prosecutor general ordered a review of 1850
pending war crimes cases to determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to proceed; many in absentia convictions were reversed by the Croatian
Supreme Court; and in 2003 Croatia passed a new law to implement the
ICC statute which created four special courts with jurisdiction to hear
these types of cases and to receive evidence gathered by the ICTY and the
ICC. 8 Nonetheless, the question remains whether cases that involve
hundreds of victims and witnesses, international cooperation and
understanding of complex international law issues, can be tried
appropriately by national courts in countries in which the national
judiciary may be biased, lacks personnel and fiscal resources, and where
many still consider the accused as national heroes.' 9
The following examples will illustrate the potential problems that a
national judiciary, such as in Croatia, might face when prosecuting
perpetrators of international war crimes.
First, problems and questions may arise in the event there is concurrent
jurisdiction between the ICTY and Croatian national courts. Rule I Ibis of
the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence raises the possibility of
concurrent jurisdiction and the Referral Bench required concurrent
jurisdiction by expecting periodic reports from the Croatian prosecutor and
by maintaining the power to recall the case to the ICTY.2 ° Once a case is
referred, however, what power does the ICTY have over the referred case?
Can the ICTY order the Croatian court to implement measures to address
any concerns the ICTY may have? Can the ICTY order Croatian courts to
call certain witnesses at trial or demand that an indictment be amended?
Can the ICTY demand Croatian authorities to apply certain legal
provisions to a case, or even require them to directly apply international
law, as opposed to domestic law? Can the ICTY play the role of a
mediator between Croatia and other countries in the region, facilitating
international cooperation to successfully pursue these cases? For example,

17.
2002, at
18.
19.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Status Report No. 11, Nov. 18,
10.
Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 10.
For a general criticism of national courts, see TransitionalJustice in Iraq, supra note 7,

at 515-18.

20. See Rule 1Ibis, supra note 11; see also Referral Bench, supra note 3, at 12.
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can the ICTY demand that relevant evidence held by one state be turned
over to the Croatian authorities? Rule 1Ibis arguably gives the ICTY the
power and authority to do many, if not all, of the above. Yet, how can the
ICTY truly enforce these powers, given its limited resources and its
limited temporal jurisdiction?
Second, witness protection may be problematic for a country as small
as Croatia. To give better context to this issue, if a witness is relocated
from the cities of Zagreb to Split in an effort to protect him or her, the
witness would be moved only two hundred miles. Rule 1Ibis and the
Referral Bench specifically conditioned the referral to Croatia on
satisfactory witness protection. 2 Although Croatia has created a witness
protection law, the witness protection program itself has never been tested
and the ICTY may be reluctant to share information on protected
witnesses.22
Third, the application of satisfactory law raises one of the biggest
concerns for the ICTY. The ICTY was established to prosecute persons
responsible for grave violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991.23 It has
codified for its use customary international and treaty law specific to these
crimes.24 Croatia's national legal system, however, was not specifically
established to hear such cases. Furthermore, Croatia has a dual system of
criminal codes, which was inherited from the former Yugoslavia and was
in force during most of the armed conflict. 25 The dual system was
abolished in 1998 by merging the two codes into one, and the "new" code
was further expanded in 2004 to include new criminal offenses, including
command responsibility. 26 Because much of the war in Croatia took place
from 1991 to 1995, the prevalent legal position is that the domestic laws
from 1991 to 1995 must be applied to these cases, which also appears to
be the position of the Croatian government in arguments in the
Ademi/Norac transfer hearings in the ICTY.2 ' However, international
observers and the ICTY prosecutorial office fear that the "old" dual
criminal code does not provide a sufficient legal basis upon which these
crimes can be tried. They would prefer Croatia to either directly apply

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Referral Bench, supra note 3, IM47-52.
Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 11.
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 11.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.; see also Referral Bench, supra note 3, 35.
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international substantive law to these cases, or retroactively apply the new
sophisticated criminal code.28
For example, take command responsibility. Command responsibility
is accepted as customary international law and codified in Article 7(3) of
the ICTY statute, as an omission mode of criminal liability.29 It holds
commanders responsible when they fail to prevent or punish subordinates
in circumstances where the commanders knew or should have known that
the subordinates were about to commit or had committed crimes. Ifa court
charged with jurisdiction over war crimes does not have this theory of
liability available to it, then subordinates in such circumstances are liable,
whereas their superiors have impunity. Similarly, international treaty and
customary law, including Protocol I ofthe Geneva Convention, recognizes
criminal liability for commanders who fail to prevent or punish.30 In
contrast, the old Croatian criminal code does not contain a provision on
command responsibility.3 Thus, the ICTY prosecutor has urged Croatian
authorities to directly apply international law.3 2 The ICTY prosecutor
points out that Croatia, as a successor state to the former Yugoslavia, is a
party to all treaties and conventions signed by the former Yugoslavia.33
Furthermore, Croatia's constitution allows for direct application and
supremacy of treaty law by its courts.34 Yet in practice, national courts are
reluctant to directly apply international law in their courts if the
international law in question has not been introduced as national
legislation. Another problem is that Protocol I of the Geneva Convention
applies to international armed conflict and given the internal nature of the
Balkan wars, it could be argued that applying international law directly in
these cases is inappropriate.35
An alternative solution would be to retroactively apply the new
Croatian criminal code, including the 2004 amendments that provide for
command responsibility, to cases that occurred in the early 1990s. 36 While

28. Referral Bench, supra note 3, 34.
29. Statute of the ICTY, art. 7(3), available at http://www.un.orglictyllegaldoc-e/index.htm
(last visited on Dec. 21, 2005).
30. See Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
31. Referral Bench, supra note 3, 33.
32. Id. 34.
33. Id. 33.
34. Id.
35. Id. 34.
36. The Croatian government cautioned against this approach but stated that ultimately its
courts would decide the issue ofretro-active application of its "old" criminal code. Referral Bench,
supra note 3,

35.
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retroactive application of international criminal law is anathema to most
legal professionals, article 7(2) of the European Convention for the
protection of Human Rights provides an exception to the general
retroactive application of criminal law. Importantly, there is authority for
the proposition that article 7(2) was included specifically to ensure that

war crimes were treated appropriately by national courts. Croatia, as a
State Party to the European Convention for the protection of Human
Rights would therefore be obligated under article 7(2) to apply its new
criminal code retroactively, to ensure that war crimes are appropriately
addressed in its courts."
Croatians seem willing to accept the concept of command
responsibility as codified in article 7(3) of the ICTY statute. However, in

order to meet the prongs of the test for command responsibility of article
7(3), they suggest a fragmented approach, consisting of pulling out
individual disparate sections of the Croatian old criminal code. 38 For
example, article 28 of the old criminal code declares that when an accused
is charged with a duty to act and failure to act results in a crime, the
accused is guilty of the crime of omission. 39 The Croatians also argue that
other legal theories, such as the theory of complicity, can be found in their
old criminal code. By putting together unrelated sections, Croatians hope
to meet the standards of command responsibility without directly applying
international law, or having to retroactively apply their subsequent law.'
However, it is not clear whether this approach can adequately address the
issue of command responsibility. For example, some argue that article 28
of the old Croatian code only applies to those with dejure rather than de
facto control. Thus, only military commanders would be liable, and not
commanders of paramilitary groups. 4 '
At the hearings before the Referral Bench on the transfer of the
Ademi/Norac case, the ICTY prosecutor and the Croatian authorities were
in disagreement over the issue of how Croatia should deal with command
responsibility. 2 Because both Ademi and Norac are facing charges for
crimes against humanity and war crimes on the basis of both individual
and command responsibility, this is very significant.
The issues that Croatian courts face, as briefly illustrated above, are
similar to those that other national courts face when international tribunals

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Jolic & Lochary, supra note 7, at 12.
Referral Bench, supra note 3, 37.
Id. 36.
Id. 37.
See, e.g., id. 41.
See generally id. M33-37.
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phase out and contemplate turning over jurisdiction of grave violations of
international humanitarian law to national courts. In countries where
perpetrators are considered national heroes and where issues of applicable
law remain unclear, one thing is certain-it will take courage and
creativity on behalf of the national legal professionals to see that justice is
done.
If such justice cannot be done, or if the form of justice achieved does
not meet the standards of the international community, the question that
remains to be answered is whether hybrid regional tribunals, such as the
Special Court for Sierra Leone,43 are the "better" solution?
Ill. SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE-A BETTER ALTERNATIVE?

Before discussing the Special Court, some background on the ICC is
warranted, as this tribunal came into existence approximately six months
after the Special Court was established. Understanding the issues
underlying the ICC is crucial to understanding why the Special Court was
established.
The ICC is the first permanent treaty-based international criminal
court." The first negotiations on the substance of the future Statute of the
ICC took place in Rome in 1998, and the ICC Statute entered into force on
July 1,2002.45 Currently, there are four cases pending before the ICC.4 99
countries are parties to the Rome Agreement of the ICC, including many
of the countries where horrible human rights violations occurred, and
whose nationals include many of the potential defendants. 47 For example,
all former Yugoslav republics are state parties to the ICC, and so are
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Many western European countries have ratified
the Rome Statute, and so has Canada.'
Nonetheless, the ICC cannot handle more than a tiny percentage of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity cases, as it faces many
problems, including lack of necessary budget and staff, jurisdictional
hurdles, and lack of political support from powerful countries such as the
43. Hybrid tribunals, beside the Special Court for Sierra Leone, exist in Kosovo and East
Timor. Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 519. The Special Court for Sierra Leone will
nonetheless be discussed in Part III as an example of hybrid tribunals.
44. Kirsch, supra note 4, at 294.
45. Id. at 295.
46. For a description of the pending cases before the ICC, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.
html (last visited on Dec. 19, 2005).
47. Id.

48. Id.
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United States. In fact, the United States has never ratified the Rome Statute
and has always been an outspoken opponent of the ICC.49 Instead, the
United States prefers regional tribunals that are country-specific, exactly
like the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 0
In 2000, Sierra Leone President Abmad Tejan Kabbah requested the
U.N. Security Council to establish an international tribunal to try those
most responsible for the atrocities that occurred during the decade-long
civil war in Sierra Leone."' An agreement between the United Nations and
the government of Sierra Leone resulted in the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. 2 The Special Court's offices and detention facilities are located in
Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone, and the Special Court is composed
of a mix of international and local personnel.5 3 The question to be
examined is whether such a hybrid regional body, located in the country
where the atrocities occurred, is a better alternative to national and
international tribunals, and whether such a hybrid tribunal will ultimately
foster the growth of the local judiciary in Sierra Leone?
The Special Court has a number of advantages over an international
tribunal.5 4 Many potential witnesses have remained in Sierra Leone and are
more easily available to testify. Much of the desired evidence for the office
of the prosecutor lies within Sierra Leone's borders. Although some of the
judges come from foreign countries, many are nationals of Sierra Leone
and might be more sensitive to the country's political situation, and are

49. Wippman, supra note 1, at 484-85; David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International
Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 529 (1999).
50. See, e.g., U.S. abstention from the vote of the U.N. Security Council regarding the
referral of a case against Sudan to the ICC, U.N. Press Release SC/8351, Security Council Refers
Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, Mar. 31, 2005, available
at http://www.un.orgNews/Press/docs/2005/sc835 1.doc.htm (last visited on Dec. 21,2005) (noting
that the United States believed that a better mechanism than the ICC would have been a hybrid
tribunal in Africa). One of the main "neutral" arguments toward the necessity to create on-site ad
hoc tribunals is that such tribunals foster the growth of the local judiciary by rebuilding the
domestic legal culture. See Hussain, supra note 4, at 569.
51. It should be noted that the United States has been a strong supporter of the Special Court
and contributes most of its funding. See Peter Penfold, Limits to Transitional Justice, STANDARD
TIMEs/ALL AFR. GLOBAL MEDIA, Mar. 15, 2005.
52. Hussain, supra note 4, at 569.
53. Id.
54. See Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 518-19 (describing the advantages of
hybrid tribunals).
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more educated about the nature of the civil war." The Sierra Leone
government specifically sought the establishment of the Special Court 6
and presumably has been cooperating with the prosecution, thereby
facilitating the prosecutor's task.17 As the prosecutions are local, the
people of Sierra Leone are more aware of them, leading to a sense of
justice for the victims and providing a stronger sense of moral education
to the local population.58
While these advantages are important, there are also many
disadvantages to this "hybrid" tribunal. As with Croatia, witness protection
programs are difficult to implement in a relatively small country. The
evidence might not be easily obtainable despite the geographic proximity
of the prosecution office, if local authorities are not willing to cooperate
with the Special Court, despite the fact that the national government
requested the Special Court to be established. Sierra Leone judges may be
biased, unwilling to judge their own people, or simply not knowledgeable
about international law. The local population, like in Croatia, may still
consider those charges with the crimes as heroes, and may blame the
government for unnecessarily imposing foreign justice.59 The mere fact
that people are in tune with the existence and the workings of the Special
Court might create problems. For example, the Court's headquarters are
in new air-conditioned buildings, which are in stark contrast to the shacks
and dilapidated buildings of Freetown where the "locals" live. Thus,
perpetrators of presumably heinous crimes are housed better than the local
population, have more to eat, have better medical help, as well as access
to international television, such as CNN and BBC News. The local
population might begin to wonder if foreign money, which could be used
to rebuild Sierra Leone, is being spent on idealistic goals of international

55. Id. at 519-20 (noting that out of eight trial and appeals judges, three were appointed by
Sierra Leone and five by the U.N. Secretary-General). The current composition of the Special Court
includes one judge from Sierra Leone in the Appeals Chamber and one judge from Sierra Leone
in the Trial Chambers. See http://www.sc-sl.org/chambers.html (last visited on Dec. 21, 2005).
56. Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 519.
57. International tribunals situated outside of the country where the atrocities were
committed, such as the ICTY and ICTR, face problems because national governments of relevant
countries will not cooperate. See Wippman, supra note 1, at 481-82 (noting the lack of cooperation
by Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and Republika Srpska in the case of the ICTY, and
the lack of cooperation by Rwanda in the case of the ICTR).
58. Id. at 518-19.
59. Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 509 (noting that a tribunal which is
perceived as a foreign agent quickly loses credibility, as the local population starts questioning
international actors and wondering whether they really understand the local needs and custom).
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justice that have nothing to do with the grim reality that the local
population faces every day.'
Finally, legal and practical problems plague the Special Court's mere
existence.
With regard to the legal problems, the Special Court was established
approximately at the same time as the Sierra Leone Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which purported to grant amnesty to the same
persons who were then indicted by the Special Court!61 The Special
Court's biggest failure, however, has been its inability to bring to justice
those individuals perceived to be the most responsible for the civil war.
The prime example is Charles Taylor, the former President of Liberia who
lived in exile in Nigeria until 2006, when Nigeria fimally agreed to transfer
him to the Special Court's authorities.62 The Special Court's former chief
prosecutor, David Crane, indicted Charles Taylor to stand trial in the
Special Court, based on allegations that Charles Taylor supported the rebel
movement responsible for most of the atrocities in Sierra Leone.63 For
several years, Crane's indictment was of little value, as Nigeria seemed
unwilling to extradite Charles Taylor to Sierra Leone. Even after Charles
Taylor was transferred to the special court, problems seemed to persist,
especially due to the political instability within Sierra Leone. Thus, it was
quickly decided to move Charles Taylor's trial to the Hague, thereby
undermining all the "proximity" linked arguments in support of hybrid
tribunals, like the special court. Moreover, while awaiting Charles Taylor's
extradition, David Crane was forced to indict other individuals over whom
he could effectively exercise the Special Court's jurisdiction. These
individuals, however, include several members of warring factions other
than the rebel movement, such as the Civil Defence Force, who are widely
seen in Sierra Leone as the "good guys" who tried to prevent genocide and
violence by combating the rebels.'
60. Id.

61. On the consideration ofthe amnesty issue by the Special Court and the TRC, see William
A. Schabas, Amnesty, The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special

Courtfor SierraLeone, 11 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'LL. & POL'Y 145, 158-65 (2004), On the relationship
between the Special Court and the TRC, see generally Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and
Conflicting Relationship Between the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. (2003); see Penfold, supra note 51

(noting problems related to the co-existence of the Special Court and the TRC); but see Transitional
Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 521 (arguing that the Special Court and the TRC have bee working
well together despite the fact that their subject matter jurisdictions overlap).
62. Penfold, supra note 51.
63. Transitional Justice in Iraq, supra note 7, at 520.

64. Penfold, supra note 51 (arguing that not even Norman's opponents accept the fact that
Norman is the person most responsible for the atrocities that happened in Sierra Leone); but see
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The Special Court is also plagued by practical problems. For example,
its funding remains troublesome and has only been secured through the
end of 2005.65 Its main personnel have already changed once, as Chief
Prosecutor David Crane and Chief Defender Simone Monasebian both
resigned earlier this year."
Given that the Special Court faces problems similar to those already
faced by international and national prosecutions of international war
crimes, and also faces other problems, it is questionable whether such a
hybrid tribunal was necessary and warranted in the first place. The main
argument for the creation of hybrid tribunals has been the proposition that
such tribunals foster the growth of the national judiciaries, because they
function in the host country, with the local judges and with the local
judicial systems. 67 However, the creation of hybrid tribunals is not the only
way to rebuild local judiciaries, and other types of international help can
certainly be made available. The international community has created a
specific forum to address human rights violations-the ICC. Should
resources be diverted from the ICC to establish a hybrid tribunal, when
such resources could be used to rebuild a war-torn country? International
justice does not necessitate the establishment of an ad hoc regional tribunal
to prosecute perpetrators of heinous human rights violations, when an
appropriate international tribunal already exists
(ICC), and when national
6 8
perpetrators.
such
try
possibly
could
courts
Eric Pape, Sierra Leone's War Crimes TribunalDefiedHistoryby GoingAfter the Victors, Not Just
the Losers, of the Country's Civil War, RebuildersofIraqAre Taking Notice, 2003 LEGAL AFF. 69
(2003) (noting the indictment of Sam Hinga Norman, which demonstrated that even "victors" could
risk standing trial like the defeated).
65. Private conversation between the author and the Special Court Principal Defender,
Vincent Nmehielle, New York, Oct. 14, 2005.
66. Sierra Leone Prosecutor Resigns, BBC NEWS, Mar. 1, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4307991.stm (last visited on Dec. 21, 2005); New Prosecutor
Selected for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, PRESS AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, May, 5, 2005, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease050505.pdf(last visited on Dec. 21, 2005); New PrincipalDefenderforthe SpecialCourt, SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, PRESS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE, June 6, 2005, available at

http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-060605.pdf (last visited on Dec. 21, 2005).
67. Hussain, supra note 4, at 569.
68. It should be noted that there could be cases where the ICC cannot prosecute a certain
offender because it does not have temporal jurisdiction over such an offender (the ICC only has
prospective jurisdiction to try offenders for violations that happened after its establishment). The
problem arises in such situations where in addition, the offender's home country is not willing or
not capable to prosecute, and where no other national judicial system is willing and capable to
prosecute. Arguably, such offenders slip through the cracks and find a safe haven in the mere fact
that nobody is capable of prosecuting them. Proponents of hybrid tribunals would argue that it
would be appropriate to set up a hybrid tribunal in such a case. Although such a solution may be
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IV. PROPOSED PARADIGMS AND SOLUTIONS

Does one type of tribunal fit all situations? It appears that certain
paradigms call for one or a combination of international tribunals, such as
the ICC, ICTY, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), hybrid tribunals, such as the Special Court, and national courts.
However, because international or hybrid tribunals cannot prosecute
everybody, national courts will most likely end up with the highest number
of defendants. Thus, the real issue becomes how to bring national courts
to an internationally acceptable level.69 In other words, because national
courts will face the highest number of prosecutions for international
crimes, how does one make sure that their judges are aware of
international law, that their procedures respect international law, and that
the substantive law that they apply is in accordance with international
70
law?
First, the creation of hybrid tribunals is not always warranted, and there
are other ways of fostering the national judiciary's growth and promoting
the development of local law. It is true that hybrid tribunals located in the
host country have certain advantages over international tribunals. 7 ' For

example, proceedings can be conducted in the local language and the local
population may be more aware of the proceedings, thereby getting a better
moral education and awareness of international law. For example, hybrid
tribunals help build the local judicial capacity, by hiring local judges and
educating them about international law.72

appropriate in very limited cases, the international community can react in different ways to assure
that such offenders are prosecuted. In most cases, the international community can encourage the
offender's home country to prosecute him by helping that country set up appropriate judicial bodies
that can function in compliance with international criminal law standards. For example, the
international community can send monitoring agencies, international judges, international legal
materials, and logistical tools to countries that are willing to prosecute international offenders. In
reality, situations where the offender's home country is not willing or capable to prosecute him are
rare. Furthermore, for any prospective violations, the ICC will have jurisdiction and will be able
to prosecute, so that the real need for further hybrid tribunals will be minimized in the future.
69. See Mundis, supra note 7, at 613 (noting that the biggest hurdle for the ICTY and the
ICTR will be "to ensure that national judiciaries can be eritrusted to provide trials that meet
international due process standards so that cases can be transferred for prosecution.").
70. For examples ofproblems that national courts face, see TransitionalJustice in Iraq,supra
note 7, at 518 (noting many inadequacies of national courts).
71. Id. at 518-19 (noting advantages that hybrid courts have over national and international
courts).
72. Id.
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Nonetheless, hybrid tribunals are not always the appropriate solution. 3
Such tribunals undermine the validity of the ICC. Instead of encouraging
countries to ratify the Rome Statute and to respect the ICC, they send the
message that the ICC might not be the best forum and that other
international prosecutions are possible.74 Furthermore, simply in terms of
resources, they take away funds that could be spent to rebuild a war-torn
country in order to establish an ad hoc tribunal, which is always very
expensive, and which does not necessarily result in a form of better justice
than the one that the ICC could provide.75 Moreover, such regional
tribunals send another message in the form of selective justice, namely that
if a powerful country, such as the United States, cares about a particular
country, such as Sierra Leone, then everything will be done to create a
specific forum which will address human rights violations.7 6 But what
about other countries, equally war torn and equally in need of some kind
of remedies-are they not as important? By sending cases to the ICC, a
more global message is sent that international justice requires prosecution
in a global forum. 7 7
Instead, the local judiciaries can be rebuilt with other types of help
from the international community that do not include the creation of
hybrid tribunals. Developed countries can establish educational programs
for local judges by sending human resources, learning tools and logistical
help to war-torn countries. For example, a number of American judges
recently went to Kosovo to work on U.N.-sponsoredjudicial panels, set up
to try war crimes cases, inter alia, and consisting of a mix of international
and local judges.7" The American judges will not be needed in Kosovo

forever-the idea is that the Kosovar judges will soon become sufficiently
educated and will be able to handle prosecutions involving international
crimes. For example, instead of creating a hybrid tribunal with western

73. See supra note 68 (discussing limited situations in which hybrid tribunals may be
appropriate).
74. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 4, at 293 (arguing that ad hoc tribunals are limited in their
deterrent effect).
75. Id. (noting the costs linked to the establishment of a new tribunal).
76. Authors have already noted that the creation and functioning of international tribunals
are influenced by powerful countries. See, e.g., Christopher C. Joyner, Redressing Impunity for
Human Rights Violations: The Universal Declaration and the SearchforAccountability, 26 DENV.
J. INT'LL. & POL'Y591, 609 (1998) (noting that international tribunals are often influenced by the
Great Powers on the Security Council and that such political considerations can undermine their
effective operation).
77. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 4, at 292 (noting that the ICC will function on a "global
scale" and that it will work toward "overcoming impunity and creating a culture of accountability").
78. Marilyn Justman Kaman, Justice Following War, INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 2005, at 13.
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judges and "international" statutes, developed countries can help set up
purely domestic tribunals, that would function under international
supervision and that would possibly report to an international organ. This
model has already been adopted in Croatia, where local authorities will
have to report to the ICTY prosecutor under Rule 11 bis of the ICTY Rules
of Procedure and Evidence. For example, developed countries can send
international legal materials to war-torn countries, in order to educate local
judges about the appropriate law to apply to international crimes. All these
solutions may help the growth of national judiciaries without imposing the
need to create more hybrid tribunals.
Second, certain heinous crimes, such as genocide and crimes against
humanity require that offenders be prosecuted in some forum, be it
international or national, and that the prosecution be in accordance with
international law, even if the offender's home country refuses to
prosecute. 9 Thus, let one assume that the weight of the evidence supports
the conclusion that a certain defendant is guilty of genocide, and let one
assume that his home country has refused to prosecute him. He should be
prosecuted in a forum capable of applying international law, or at least
capable of applying national law that is in compliance with international
law. Thus, such a defendant could be prosecuted in the ICC, in a hybrid
body, such as the Special Court, or in a country other than his home
country capable of conducting a prosecution in accordance with
international law. Which would be the best forum? Such a defendant
should be prosecuted either in an international forum, such as the ICC, or
in a national forum in a country that is willing and capable to prosecute,
that is, a national forum that can acquire some form of jurisdiction over
him, for example, universal jurisdiction."0 Such a defendant should not be
prosecuted by a hybrid tribunal, such as the Special Court, mainly because
the creation of such ad hoc regional tribunals undermines the validity of
the ICC, and from a more pragmatic point of view, because resources in
a country like Sierra Leone could be better spent on other efforts, such as
judicial education, infrastructure, medicine, and so forth. Thus, whether
such a defendant should be prosecuted in an international forum or a
national forum would depend on a variety of factors.

79. For the argument that there is a duty to prosecute, see generally Michael Scharf, The
Letter of the Law: The Scope of the InternationalLegal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights
Crimes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (1996); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibilityto
Investigate andProsecute Grave Human Rights Violations in InternationalLaw, 78 CAL. L. REV.
451, 548-61, 484 n.187 (1990).
80. For a discussion of universal jurisdiction, see, e.g., Ryan Rabinovitch, Universal
Jurisdiction In Absentia, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 500 (2005).
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The fundamental question is whether there is a country that is willing
and capable to prosecute such a well-known defendant, and if so, whether
practically it makes more sense for such a country to prosecute him?"' For
example, to determine if a national prosecution is warranted, we should
look at the following factors: the geographic location of the evidence and
witnesses needed to testify; the feasibility of a witness protection plan; the
competence of the local judiciary; the existence of a national criminal code
in compliance with international law; the presence of an appropriate
infrastructure, as well as the country's
physical capability to exercise
2
defendant.1
a
such
over
jurisdiction
Yet, even if a country is capable and willing to prosecute a well-known
defendant, in particularly heinous cases involving well-known offenders,
or in situations involving countries such as Sierra Leone, Sudan, or the
former Yugoslavia, where horrible human rights violations occurred, it
would be warranted to have the prosecution take place in the ICC, mainly
because such a prosecution sends a stronger message to the rest of the
world that this type of behavior will not be condoned
8 3 and that the
international community will act to stop such behavior.
Third, in some cases where the home country of the offender is capable
and willing to prosecute, and where the offender is less known, or where
the violation involved is a lesser offense, such as aggression or
kidnapping, it is appropriate to permit national courts to prosecute.8 There
are numerous reasons for this. For one, the international tribunals cannot
prosecute everybody and are forced to choose their indictments carefully.85
The ICC Statute specifically embraces the principle of complementarity,
which cedes ICC jurisdiction to member states when member states are

81. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 4, at 299 (discussing whether a certain state is willing to
investigate or prosecute offenders).
82. But see Neil J. Kritz, Coming To Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms For Mass Violations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 134-35
(1996) (discussing dangers of unfairness related to domestic trials).
83. Kirsch, supra note 4, at 293 (noting that "only a permanent international criminal court
can most effectively deal with the gravest offenses known to humankind"); Payam Akhavan,
Justice in the Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 737,749 (1999) (arguing
that through punishment of particular individuals we can achieve an instrument through which
respect for the rule of law is instilled into the popular consciousness).
84. Accordingly, both the ICTY and the ICTR have now begun focusing only on the most
senior perpetrators while ensuring that cases involving minor perpetrators are transferred to
appropriate national jurisdictions for trial. See Mundis, supra note 7, at 591.
85. See, e.g., Kritz, supra note 82, at 133 (noting that the ICTY and ICTR have limited their
prosecutions to a relatively small number of people for both practicality and policy reasons).
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willing to prosecute. 6 Thus, it is better for international tribunals to
prosecute people like Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor, because
such prosecutions are often the most difficult, require a large amount of
resources and sophisticated judges, and because such prosecutions send the
strongest message to the rest of the world that heinous crimes committed
by dictators will not be tolerated. Moreover, it is important to let national
courts prosecute lesser offenders. National jurisdictions, especially in wartorn countries, have to grow, so that allowing them to prosecute offenders
of important crimes might help them rebuild their criminal codes and their
judiciary.87 Prosecutions might also be necessary as part of the country's
healing process, and prosecutions in the country that suffered a civil war
are going to be a lot more effective than ICC prosecutions taking place at
the Hague. As previously noted, the advantages of prosecution in the home
country include: the proximity of the evidence and the witnesses; the
judges' awareness of the nature of the conflict that occurred; the
government's cooperation; as well as the fact that such national
prosecutions might be part of the home country's healing process. Thus,
it seems that a national prosecution would be warranted in some cases, and
that the ICTY's transfer of the Ademi/Norac case was well decided,
provided that the Croatian tribunals are able to appropriately apply
domestic law in compliance with international law.
Fourth, in reality, the decision to resort to any type of
prosecution-international, hybrid, or national-is often influenced by
political pressure coming from different levels. International, regional, and
national powers often collide in their conception of the best form of
justice. Thus, whether an international or a hybrid tribunal can be
established often depends on whether international, regional, and national
powers come to a conclusion about the appropriate forum and the
appropriate body of law that it should apply. For example, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone was established through an agreement between the
national government of Sierra Leone (a national body) and the U.N.
Security Council (an international body)."8 For example, the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was a form of national
redress for human rights violations, was established by the country's
government, specifically because the South African government did not

86. Kirsch, supranote 4, at 293(noting that complementarityaffords primacyto national legal
systems and that the ICC "will not become involved where national systems genuinely investigate

or prosecute [international human rights offenses]").
87. See Hussain, supranote 4, at 570 (noting that one of the purposes of the Special Court
is to help rebuild a strong national judicial system).
88. Id. at 568-69.
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want other regional countries to meddle in its own justice system. 9 For
example, negotiation over the establishment of a regional tribunal in
Burundi collapsed in 1995. The United Nations began negotiating the
establishment of an internationally-supported tribunal in Burundi, which
would address the human rights violations that occurred within Burundi
and that were in reality part of the Rwandan civil war.90 Such negotiations
collapsed over the death penalty. Nearly all European countries opposed
the creation of an international or regional tribunal which would provide
for the imposition of the death penalty. Nearly all Burundi representatives
present at the negotiations were adamant about being able to impose the
death penalty on human rights offenders. 9' The tribunal was never
established.92 Similarly, a war crimes tribunal is only now being
established in Cambodia, despite the atrocities committed by the Khmer
Rouge regime, simply because the current government encompasses some
former Khmer Rouge members and has been recently unwilling to let
anybody stand trial in fear of inculpating itself.93
In other cases, the creation of an international tribunal was a direct
consequence of the international pressure and determination to do so,
despite the national government's unwillingness to participate in
international proceedings. For example, the ICTY and the ICTR were
established despite the former Yugoslavia's and Rwanda's protests. In
both of these cases, The U.N. Security Council exercised its powers and
decided to trump these countries' sovereignty, because the international
community decided that it was in the interest of global peace and justice
to establish such tribunals.94 Similarly, the U.N. Security Council recently
referred a case against Sudan to the ICC, against Sudan's consent.95 The
above cases illustrate that the best theoretical solution might not be
possible in reality, and that political pressure coming from the
international, regional, and national levels often dictates the final solution.

89. For a description of the South African TRC, see generally Emily W. Schabacker,
Reconciliationor JusticeandAshes: Amnesty Commissions andthe Duty to PunishHuman Rights
Offenses, 12 N.Y. INT'LL. REv. 1, 19-20 (1999).
90. Clinton Should Back Effective Justice in Burundi, HUM. RTS. NEWS, Aug. 22, 2000,

availableat http://hrw.org/english/docs/2000/08/22/burund735.htm (last visited on Dec. 22,2005)
[hereinafter Clinton Should].

91. Private conversation between the author and one ofthe negotiators, held on Oct. 15,2005.
92.
93.
94.
95.
Magnus,

ClintonShould, supranote 90.
TransitionalJusticein Iraq,supra note 7, at 516-17.
Id. at 511,514.
See S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. SCOR, 60th Sess., 5158th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (2005);
supranote 2, at 15.
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V. CONCLUSION

Which prosecution-international, hybrid, or regional-is best for
which country? In light of all of the above, the conclusion that imposes
itself is that nearly all situations require a case-by-case examination of all
the surrounding circumstances. In other words, theoretical values, such as
deterrence, retribution, and national reconciliation need to be combined
with practical considerations in order to reach a conclusion as to which
type of prosecution might be best for a particular country or a particular
conflict. The above paradigms should provide some guidelines as to which
solution might be theoretically best for which country or conflict, despite
real problems stemming from politics and policy, which always underlie
the creation of any treaty-based tribunal.
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